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Abstract This paper provides a review of Reconstructing ‘Education’ through Mindful 
Attention: Positioning the Mind at the Center of Curriculum and Pedagogy by Oren Ergas. 
The review examines the central argument of the book, namely that present educational 
theory and practice avoids substantial self-inquiry, paying lip service to reflective practice 
but stopping short of any real encounter with the complex dynamics of the self. In Ergas’ 
bold inquiry, we are invited to attend and to see for ourselves by considering perspectives 
and practices rooted in contemplative traditions. The educational context becomes clear as 
attention to the self entails formation of the self. However, I argue that it is not clear why 
contemplative traditions (or mindful attention defined by the text) are best placed to engage 
in such formation. I suggest that a central problem with the book is the conflation here of 
education and socialisation, and that more systematic treatment of educational questions 
might obviate some of the troubling issues around the failures of what is called the inner 
curriculum.
Keywords Mindfulness · Attention · Socialization · Experience · Contemplation
The basic concern of this book is to show that learning about ourselves is a vital edu-
cational endeavor. It is made strikingly plain that present educational theory and practice 
ignores or avoids substantial self-inquiry, paying lip service to reflective practice but stop-
ping woefully short of any real encounter with the complex dynamics of the self. In this 
bold inquiry, we are invited to attend, to see for ourselves, in an argument whose simplicity 
masks a sustained dwelling with, and in, the perspectives and practices that are fundamen-
tally rooted in contemplative traditions. Although only occasional reference is made to tra-
ditions of contemplative practice—e.g. Buddhist, Daoist, Hindu—it is clear that the author 
draws from deep wells in developing his argument. As a student of education, philosophy 
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and religious experience myself, I am fascinated by the orientation taken in this book. How 
could higher education, for instance, only concern curricula that stand ‘outside’ of the stu-
dent? Contemplative traditions have consistently drawn attention to the fundamental nature 
of an ‘inner’ inquiry, and this book attempts to reorient wider educational structures in 
similar directions. So then, who is the thinker of ‘my’ thoughts? What control do I have 
over my mind and body? How might I disrupt the thought patterns that habitually appear? 
As an academic, I have lived with these questions always at the fringes of my interests. 
Only occasionally do I find them systematically addressed as they are in this book.
What Makes Us?
The book begins with a consideration of what makes the mind? The question might 
be shortened: ‘What makes us?’ a refinement that disrupts an implicit dualism. For we 
are not only minds, we are embodied, something Ergas goes on to take very seriously. 
However the question is framed, Ergas places education at the center of the making 
or forming process. Education is taken to be the fundamental agent of formation, and 
it needs ‘reconstructing’ because it is making us in ways that are inadequate. What is 
inadequate about the ways education makes us? The book does not pose this question in 
order to engage in a critical analysis of educational policies and practices, though such 
critical thinking should follow. Ergas is attempting to get at something more elusive and 
foundational: the inner curriculum that makes us, and that, we also make ourselves. It 
is better to say that the book seeks to rebalance education between an outer and inner 
curriculum; in an age of measurement, it seems that education is assumed to concern 
only the ‘outer’. Drawing on Elliot Eisner’s curricular model, Ergas argues that while 
curriculum theorists develop explicit curricula, and critical pedagogues examine the 
problems of implicit curricula, few theorists have considered inner curricula: what takes 
place within the personhood of the student, apart from the psychological developments 
that learning theories consider (pp. 105–110). The inner life of the student is of vital 
existential significance, but part of an excluded or ignored ‘null curriculum.’ Educa-
tional theory and practice largely fails to consider that which is decisive in the making 
of who we actually are: “[t]he narrative that runs in your mind throughout your day 
(e.g., your worries, hopes, dreams, thoughts of your social-image, body-image), your 
emotional life, and your bodily sensations are all subject matter that forms an inner cur-
riculum” (p. 3).
In responding to the question of what it is that makes us, Ergas argues that the central 
problem of education is our tendency to take as necessary what is, in fact, contingent. Our 
identities, formed through habits and conditions that have shaped us, seem substantial and 
necessary, rather than ephemeral and contingent. Realising that we might be made differ-
ently is crucial to a balanced education, but is largely absent from the educational pro-
cesses as Ergas presents them. Although we may learn about ourselves by way of encoun-
ters with others, we are seldom encouraged to learn about ourselves directly. My habitual 
responses, whether emotional or intellectual, seem so evidently mine that I do not generally 
inquire into, or experience, their contingency. As an ex-teacher at a Krishnamurti school, 
where inquiry into this inner space is made explicit, I find these inquiries very familiar 
and worthwhile. I agree with Ergas that educational patterns and processes contribute to 
the feeling of a stable and fixed identity and I appreciate the cultivation of detachment in 
this regard. Those patterns and processes fail to draw sufficient attention to the features 
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and structures of our identity: that we are of a particular time, place, gender, ethnicity and 
so on, but, more importantly, that these particularities might be otherwise. While philoso-
phers of identity have long addressed these issues, few take the direct route suggested by 
this book. Ergas does not go into great detail to explain the mechanisms, broadly arguing 
that the habituations and conditions of social life (mediated by language, cultural prac-
tices, ethical norms, media and so on) collude to enframe us. This does not just concern 
the formal identity markers of gender, ethnicity and so forth, but also our habits of mind: 
our hopes and dreams, desires and tastes, reactions and responses in daily life. Rather like 
our social media feeds that reflect the attitudes and dispositions of the user profile but are 
too easily experienced as proxies for wider, more ‘objective’ social attitudes, our inner life 
is at risk of becoming an ‘echo chamber’ in conversation only with itself, while deluding 
itself that its perspective is universal. Ergas laments how perception and reaction are not, 
in themselves, taken to be objects of educational inquiry, but are ignored or avoided as 
distractions to the educational process. He makes the point that, in fact, perception entails a 
reduction (or pruning) of the overwhelming mass of data that the senses might receive, to a 
coherent sensory input. As I will go on to argue, it is not clear why this process of percep-
tual reduction is considered educational, though Ergas is surely right that the selections and 
reductions of perception are formative: they have a significant role in making us who we 
are. I would question the idea that everything formative is best understood as educational, 
and I hope to convince you, dear reader, that this is more than a semantic issue.
The approach that Ergas initially takes, is to temporarily forget ‘education’ and ‘soci-
ety’, and to study the mind; to ask “what experiences are available to the mind?” (p. 13). 
This is not treated simply as a theoretical inquiry, but also entails the “first-person experi-
ence” (p. 9) of the reader. This experience is enacted through mindful attention and con-
templative inquiry whose goal for the reader is to provide a richer understanding of the 
analysis at hand. This direct method of experiential inquiry is uncommon among academic 
texts. Periodically the reader is asked to engage in short exercises in attention (spend-
ing, say, 3 min observing and writing down what comes to mind) so that the text weaves 
together the experiential and the conceptual. Some readers will be shifting uneasily in their 
metaphorical and literal armchairs, uncomfortable with the idea of a putatively academic 
text inviting mindful practice, suspicious, perhaps, that any clarity of argument would be 
compromised by experiential flights, or that these efforts presuppose an untenable separa-
tion of the intellect from experience. These experiments are, though, well-aligned with the 
deeper goals of the book: to argue that the mind can be reclaimed from ‘society’ and ‘edu-
cation’ (p. 14) through mindful attention. So, the experiential approach is not only appro-
priate, well-judged and illuminating, it is arguably the only way to expose the problem 
being addressed: that educational discourse and practice fails to give any consideration to 
the inner life of human formation.
The Education of Me
Ergas presents a two-stage process of subjective formation: firstly, there is the experienc-
ing I which has discrete, immediate sensory-laden experiences of things; secondly, through 
socializing forms of education, the I attaches particular meanings to significant experiences 
and objects, that help to constitute a sense of identity and form a narrative self. The favored 
analogy within the book is that of a necklace:
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Let us consider life as a concatenation of discrete moments of experience. Such 
moments are unimaginably rich in content (e.g., background noise, a thought, a word 
uttered, a fleeting sensation). Let us think of every content-possibility as a bead, 
hence every discrete moment of experience offers numerous such beads. Just as a 
child stands against the splendor of a box filled with beads so does our mind stand 
against the richness of experience and selects from its content moment-by-moment. 
The necklace formed in this process is your life as it unfolds through the act of 
threading (p. 46).
The formation of the narrative self, that emerges as a development from the experienc-
ing I entails a reduction from a range of possible experiences and identities, to a singular 
person, the me self that is constructed by the interactions between the experiencing I and 
the social world. Borrowing from recent neuroscience, Ergas presents this as a process of 
pruning; contrary to the idea that the I expands to encompass a self in a larger social world, 
here the universal experience and infinite potential of the I must be pruned back so that a 
particular self can be ‘made’, a self with a particular, linguistic, social, cultural identity. 
This process of mind-making “prunes the mind based on the moment-to-moment process 
of perception and stamps those moments in the image of its particularity” (p. 61). The 
characteristic dualisms that result from this process are manifold: internal/external; in here/
out there; me/not me; subject/object. These dualisms arise through an implicit and ignored 
inner curriculum. Language has a key part to play in this individuation: “we are trained 
from day one to label the world based on language as our basic means for communica-
tion. Without anyone mentioning this to us we learn that labeling the world is desirable 
and effective.” (p. 73). This leads Ergas to suggest a rather unconvincing progression from 
an originary pre-linguistic first nature, with language and labeling giving rise to a subse-
quent second nature. While Ergas is careful not to give easy ontological priority to this first 
nature, one can’t help feeling that the pruning and labeling associated with the formation of 
the self are interpreted as something of a fall from the garden of pure attention. This struc-
ture is suggested by claims that, for instance, “we are trained” (p. 73) to label the world. 
We may be conditioned or socialized by the language we learn, but is that really training 
or education, and is it not better to acknowledge that language precedes our coming into 
the world? Most significantly, this points to a lack of distinction between certain key ideas 
in the book: namely socialization and education (or conditioning and training)? To be fair, 
Ergas does not use the term socialization that much, though it is not clear why. In other 
words, why does Ergas consider the issue of formation to be an educational one, rather 
than one of socialization or conditioning?
Reconstructing Socialization Through Mindful Attention?
The conflation of socialization and education is not uncommon among critical discourses 
in education: consider, for instance, the desire to expose the operation of a hidden cur-
riculum, or the operations of social reproduction in educational spaces. Within the general 
terms of this book, the implications of this conflation are profound. For the argument turns 
upon the blindness that socialization-education enacts. Ergas calls this blindness to self the 
illusion of omniscience: “despite the fact that what we attend to is only one possible per-
spective on this moment, our most immediate sense is that it is the only available perspec-
tive” (p. 78). My own question here is whether the illusion of omniscience arrives through 
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the absence of an inner curriculum and whether this illusion requires a reconstruction of 
education or socialization? For much of what Ergas says about education might be more 
commonly and, perhaps, more accurately and usefully described as socialization. Ergas dis-
cusses at length the issue that it is society that frames the pruning process. It is presented as 
a largely unconscious (or pre-conscious?) process or at least a process that we do not attend 
to. Isn’t it this hidden-structural dimension that determines the process as one of socializa-
tion rather than education? Education can be distinguished from socialization by virtue of 
the fact that education entails an intentional and deliberate intervention between a student 
and the world. This intervention might be performed by a teacher but also can be done 
by the self to the self (as in the German idea of Selbstbildung). In general terms, this is 
what enables us to distinguish educational interventions from unconscious socialization or 
experiences in general. Within this still broad conception of education, one could identify 
a range of educational experiences whose concern is more specifically to draw attention to 
the contingencies of existence: to develop some kind of question about the nature of one’s 
immediate perspective. From Ergas’ point of view, the process of pruning the self is not 
presented as something intentional, that there is a policy for or established practices to sup-
port. This might be considered ‘informal’ education, but even this term suggests something 
deliberately ‘cultivated’ (Jeffs and Smith 2011). Rather, self-making seems to precede any 
decision to influence or shape it made by those that constitute it. There is something para-
doxical about the idea of the self-forming itself. Little wonder then, that forming the self 
takes its cue from the outer social world. So what happens to the arguments in the book if 
we swap ‘education’ with ‘socialisation’. For a start, the title would change to Reconstruct-
ing ‘Socialisation’ through Mindful Attention. This would be a worthwhile approach as 
long as one does not hastily cast socialization as a pathology. Socialisation surely needs our 
attention. But it is also evident, to borrow a phrase made popular (again) by Jacques Der-
rida and Bernard Stiegler, pharmacological in nature: socialisation is simultaneously what 
makes us who we are, but also what inhibits and prevents us from being who we are (or 
becoming more than that); it is both the poison and the cure. Socialisation is not something 
we could or would wish to do without, but it’s very formative nature is what makes it what 
it is. That nature might carry some pathology or prejudice, but the formative processes 
themselves are not unfortunate excesses of socialization that we should attempt to legislate 
out. One cannot have one’s socialized cake without eating it. One cannot have an identity 
as this without being, in a certain sense, not that.
But Ergas’ point may be precisely that the intentional focus on self-formation should be 
much more developed and explicit than it is: that education should interrupt the problems 
and illusions of socialization. It is certainly plausible to argue that self-formation should 
not be left to the contingencies of socialization as an unconscious process, or the habitu-
ated mechanisms of human perception, action, and reaction. Self-formation should be pre-
cisely more educational by becoming an area of conscious pedagogical reflection: where 
the self reflects upon its relation to itself in a considered manner. This is certainly implied 
within much of the book and frees much of the argument from the danger that the inner 
curriculum is not ‘education’: “this is about making me into a more explicit curriculum” 
(p. 222).
But the question then becomes whether explicit examination of the structures and for-
mations of identity could or should take place as a distinct inner curriculum: distinct, that 
is, from the outer curriculum. Or indeed, whether this distinction between inner and outer 
really stands up to any scrutiny. One could reasonably suppose that addressing the structure 
and formation of the I is, and generally always has been, an essential feature of the outer 
curriculum, even when appearing to address matters of the world, a point I will develop 
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in due course. If there is no commitment to this kind of inner inquiry within general outer 
curricula around the world, the reasons might well pertain to a political or cultural ideol-
ogy that reduces education to only that which is functionary, instrumental and measurable. 
So I am left to wonder whether the real target of the argument is the absence of the inner 
curriculum as such or a more general problem with curricula being appropriated to instru-
mentalism which has little time for that which cannot be measured. Where depression and 
despair make people less effective, we do see programmes that support self-inquiry, sug-
gesting that the problem is broader than the absence of an inner curriculum. It might be 
replied that such interventions really amount to an ‘inside-out’ curriculum, in which the 
inner life is framed by concepts that rely on an outer theoretical construction. Neverthe-
less, I would still caution that the emphasis on a distinct inner curriculum might serve only 
to distract from the systemic educational issues that critical theorists have long sought to 
expose.
But the further point here is that the conception of education as an intentional interven-
tion almost always entails some form of disruption of what we might regard as the con-
ventions of subjectivity, and socialization (see e.g. Biesta 2010). To illustrate the point, 
Socratic pedagogy entails experiences of self-alienation or transformation, inducing the 
experience of aporia as a key moment (though not conclusion) of dialectic. Here the dis-
tinction between inner and outer curricula does not seem to hold since the knowledge 
derived through dialectic is always transformative of the self: Socratic education is little 
else than learning how virtue and knowledge are indivisible, thus fusing the inner nature 
and the nature of the world. An alternative illustration might be found in the German peda-
gogical tradition, which has also long explored education as being fundamentally a form 
of (self)-alienation. It is an alienation from the feeling of necessity that characterizes the 
Humboldtian experience of bildung, such as, for example, Goethe’s travels through Italy 
which were self-consciously formative. Here bildung is precisely directed to the illusion of 
omniscience as discussed by Ergas. Moreover, there may be important educational reasons 
why the inner curriculum is not approached ‘directly’, but is stumbled upon by way of seri-
ous engagement with ‘outer’ cultural forms. For instance, we experience catharsis when 
fictional scenarios resonate with our own self-identity, a resonance that contributes to the 
formation of our own inner life when we experience it played out before us. Thus, Hamlet’s 
dilemmas embody human questions that are our own: all the world’s a stage. The task of 
education is surely to develop an outer curriculum that itself constitutes an inner curricu-
lum. I am reminded of Ian Munday’s reference (Munday 2012) to a scene from Alan Ben-
nett’s play The History Boys which illustrates this well:
Hector: And now for some poetry of a more traditional sort.
Timms: Oh, God!
Hector: Er, Timms, w–w-what is this?
Timms: Sir, I don’t always understand poetry.
Hector: You don’t always understand it? Timms, I never understand it. But learn it now, 
know it now, and you will understand it, whenever.
Timms: I don’t see how we can understand it. Most of the stuff poetry’s about hasn’t 
happened to us yet.
Hector: But it will Timms, it will. And when it does, you’ll have the antidote ready. 
Grief, happiness, even when you’re dying. We’re making your deathbeds here, boys. 
(Bennett 2004)
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So although Ergas argues that “[a]ttention can be ‘educated’” (p. 277) he seems only 
concerned with how mindful attention as a contemplative inner inquiry can educate atten-
tion, or at least does not go far enough in acknowledging that the education of attention 
might entail an encounter with things outside the self: music, poetry, maths and so on. 
Identity and agency are surely thereby educated, too, and we are disabused of the illu-
sion of omniscience. There is more than a hint of withdrawal in Ergas’ account of self-
formation. Furthermore, consideration of the possibility that direct self-examination might 
be counter-productive would also be welcome within the discussion. Vicarious or indirect 
experience is not incidental to subjective formation, but may be the most effective process 
for it.
There are signs that a wider concern for the inner lives of students is entering educa-
tional discourse through, for instance, the widespread interest in character education, and 
the emerging centrality of social and emotional skills in recent OECD literature (OECD 
2015). In England, this is framed in terms of ‘spiritual, moral, social and cultural develop-
ment’ (SMSC) of pupils in schools, which has rather unfortunately been associated with a 
confused notion of the promotion of British values, itself a part of general securitization 
of education (see Lewin 2017). From the perspective of this book, I think these examples 
suggest that attempts to address the inner landscape are often usurped by the given con-
temporary ideology. So Ergas certainly has a point: the extent to which the outer and inner 
have bifurcated in the context of an assessment driven, quantitative, standards-based, neo-
liberal educational system, must be acknowledged. Attention to what will take us through 
the exam is surely the priority, to the detriment of education itself. While I am sympathetic 
to the analysis presented in this original and engaging book, I am not sure the answer is to 
directly employ an inner curriculum. Rather shouldn’t the curriculum be uncoupled from 
neo-liberal ideology such that the questions of human existence are dwelt upon and experi-
enced as real? That reality is neither simply inner or outer, but would unite the two.
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